International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy
Abusive partnerships: New forms of governance, new forms of abuse?
Mike Rowe
Article information:
To cite this document:
Mike Rowe, (2006),"Abusive partnerships", International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 26 Iss
5/6 pp. 207 - 219
Permanent link to this document:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/01443330610674251
Downloaded on: 23 January 2015, At: 11:19 (PT)
References: this document contains references to 40 other documents.
To copy this document: permissions@emeraldinsight.com
The fulltext of this document has been downloaded 986 times since 2006*
Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by 549148 []
For Authors
If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for
Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines
are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information.
About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.com
Emerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company
manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as
providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services.
Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee
on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive
preservation.
*Related content and download information correct at time of download.
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)
Abusive partnerships
New forms of governance, new forms of abuse?
Mike Rowe
University of Liverpool Management School, University of Liverpool,
Liverpool, UK
Abstract
Purpose The purpose of this article is to critically consider the role of partnerships in regeneration.
There has been a proliferation of partnerships at local, sub-regional and regional levels, that has
brought new people together around a shared agenda, and has sought to challenge and change the
ways in which mainstream public services are delivered.
Design/methodology/approach This article uses a qualitative approach drawing on previous
research work and using narrative to construct a series of metaphors to provide greater levels of
explanation and understanding of partnerships.
Findings The current approach to partnership working arises principally from analysis of the
weaknesses of fragmented services, it is also attractive to those who seek to open up the cosy,
inefficient and, at times, corrupt worlds of local government. This is shown through an innovative
typology of partnerships.
Research limitations/implications While there are sound policy reasons for engaging in the
game of partnerships, there are dangers in underestimating the capacity of public agencies to adopt
and adapt the language of partnership, without genuinely engaging with the intent behind the policy.
Practical implications The implications from this article have practical relevance for those
working in public policy and for those involved in partnerships.
Originality/value By drawing upon examples of the abuse of partnership arrangements, this
article provides an original perspective on those phenomena that might be an indication of trouble.
Keywords Local government, Regeneration, Community relations, Partnerships
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
A plethora of material suggests that partnerships, while a good idea on paper, are
particularly problematic in practice (Mayo, 1997; Byrne, 2001; Geddes, 2001; Lister,
2002; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004; Mayo, 1997; Mayo and Taylor, 2001; Powell et al.,
2001; Taylor, 2000, 2001, 2003). The focus of much of this writing has been upon the
tensions and dilemmas inherent in a policy that seeks to engage people from across
sectors in decision-making and to challenge and change mainstream services. More
recently, formal evaluations of the New Deal for Communities regeneration programme
have indicated similar problems and themes (NAO, 2004; NRU, 2003). However, this
paper will seek to approach these themes from a different perspective. Yes, the idea of
partnership is hard to put into practice, but the problems are aggravated by the way
some seek to adapt to and undermine the policy. This is particularly the case with local
authorities but it is also true of other public agencies and voluntary and community
organisations. In doing so, I approach the subject having seen some of the potential
fulfilled in practice (Rowe and Devanney, 2003) and as a disappointed observer of a
failure to learn from and develop on such experience (Rowe and Taylor, 2005).
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/0144-333X.htm
Abusive
partnerships
207
International Journal of Sociology and
Social Policy
Vol. 26 No. 5/6, 2006
pp. 207-219
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0144-333X
DOI 10.1108/01443330610674251
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)
Before going on to look at these issues, a few words about the nature of the evidence
deployed in this piece. It does not arise from any formal research. It is in the nature of
the narratives presented here that they are not acknowledged openly, and certainly not
to outsiders. Instead, the narratives have been gleaned from conversations with
practitioners, often in informal settings, leaked confidential reports and other material,
including press coverage. Only narratives supported by two or more sources have been
used. At the same time, and for obvious reasons, the examples are presented
anonymously. Indeed, to ensure that no case can be easily identified, I have combined
some aspects of different cases while endeavouring to present narratives that neither
exaggerate nor mislead (Watson, 2000).
I hope the narratives told will echo the experiences of many of those engaged with
partnerships, whether as participants or observers. They point to issues of power and
inequality within partnerships of real significance to those concerned with the themes
of regeneration and inclusion. These issues, while not universal, are common. Much of
the practitioner literature fails to seriously address questions of power. Indeed, the
NRU only recently seems to have taken questions of governance particularly seriously
following the publication of the recent NAO report (NAO, 2004; NRU, 2004). On the
other hand, academic literature suggests that questions of power represent almost
insurmountable barriers to the practice of partnership (Southern, 2002). It is as an
attempt to get beyond these responses that this paper might contribute to developing
our understandings of the forms that partnerships take. More than simply exposing
particular activities, I wish to draw wider lessons of relevance to policy makers,
practitioners and academics. Clearly, this presents some problems. The material in this
piece might be all too easily dismissed and ignored, unsupported as it is by traditional
evidence. However, a detailed description of case studies, citing of evidence and
reference to real events might easily reveal the subjects of this work and expose the
whistleblowers. Given this, I hope the reader will accept and bear with the use of the
narratives. If it rings true to practitioners and researchers familiar with the field, then
the learning might also carry weight.
The new agenda of partnership
During the 1980s and the early 1990s, the Conservative government was unwilling to
trust local government with public services and, not least, with regeneration. Instead,
they turned to the business sector, forming Urban Development Corporations and
Enterprise Zones to administer funds (Roberts, 1999). The private sector would bring a
focus upon economic benefits, thus creating jobs, generating innovation and bringing
financial disciplines not to be found in the public sector. While this approach was
consistent with the government’s policies, privileging the needs of business over the
interests of a wider community, there were problems and tensions in the programmes
that emerged. In a number of instances, there were serious concerns about the way
funds were disbursed, the adequacy of procedures to ensure against conflicts of
interest and the governance arrangements within (NAO, 1997, 2002). Such concerns
were not limited to the conduct of business in a regeneration context but became
widespread as private sector management practices permeated the public sector
(Committee of Public Accounts, 1994; Committee on Standards in Public Life, 1996,
1997a,b). By the 1990s, some of the government’s hostility to local government
dissipated, in part because of a recognition that a business and property-led approach
IJSSP
26,5/6
208
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)
to regeneration could not resolve some of the deeper social problems in Britain’s cities.
Partnerships between public and private agencies became the vehicle for delivering
change in the inner cities. However, City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget
were not immune to governance problems and the effectiveness of partnership
arrangements varied greatly (Rhodes et al., 2003).
The Labour government, elected in 1997, built upon these nascent partnerships,
extending the scope to encompass the voluntary and community sectors and to
embrace a much more holistic agenda. Fundamentally, the government argues that, by
working across organisational and sectoral boundaries, better value will be derived
from public spending, particularly at a local level (Cabinet Office, 1999; DTLR, 2001;
SEU, 1998). At the same time, the business sense of the private sector would be
tempered by the social concerns of the public, voluntary and charity sectors. More
specifically, the benefits to be derived include:
.
greater sharing of information and resources between public agencies, and
between the public, charity, voluntary, community and business sectors;
.
better coordination of public services, securing efficiencies both in terms of cash
savings and improved delivery;
.
engagement with local communities to better plan and design service provision,
thus improving take-up and outcomes;
.
through participation, build capacity and “social capital” in excluded
communities;
.
allow for experimentation and learning from small-scale initiatives,
mainstreaming these where they prove effective;
.
more effective interventions to deal with complex social problems (the “wicked
issues”);
.
greater accountability and oversight of public services; and
.
improvements in local democratic life, both through participation in
decision-making and in elections.
Local Strategic Partnerships, Community Strategies, Community Empowerment
Networks, Neighbourhood Renewal Funding and a host of other initiatives have
sought to develop the local infrastructure to enable these benefits.
Central to the understanding of partnerships, particularly in a neighbourhood
renewal context, is the role of client groups and resident members of the community.
Perhaps more than any other participating sector, residents bring a previously
untapped perspective to the challenge of resolving difficult social problems and
exclusion. They might bring a form of intelligence and, in a sense, power to a
partnership, an understanding of what does and does not work, for whom and why. By
not simply criticising local services but also by participating in the development of
alternative arrangements, the local community brings both accountability and
legitimacy. As such, the way in which they are engaged in the process of partnership
working is central to an understanding of the effectiveness of a partnership.
How to effectively incorporate the diverse range of experiences and voices to be
found in excluded communities is a central problem for partnerships (Jones, 2003;
Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004; Mayo and Taylor, 2001; Taylor, 2000, 2001, 2003). Are
Abusive
partnerships
209
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)
individuals on boards sufficient? How are they to be accountable for the views they
express? Is consultation a sufficient substitute for wider participation? For local
authorities, and particularly elected members, the development of other forms of
democratic expression has sometimes been interpreted as a threat to their role as
elected representatives. How can different forms of democratic expression sit
alongside, or even complement each other? In essence, partnership communicates a
general understanding while concealing much that is very different in the way
individuals interpret the new priorities of consultation, participation and
empowerment (6, 1997; Rhodes, 1997). Nor are multiple understandings simply an
academic affair. Indeed, differences in understanding are, perhaps, more common and
evident in the patterns of practice to be observed across the country (Rowe and
Devanney, 2003). The language has changed but, beneath the facade, there is much
that has remained the same. A number of possible reasons for these problems can be
found in academic and practitioner debates.
First, there is genuine confusion about the idea of governance at a local level,
particularly with respect to how the numerous elements of the Local Government
Modernisation Agenda (DTLR, 2001) fit with elements of the Neighbourhood Renewal
Strategy (SEU, 1998). Indeed, it is not clear that the connections have been clearly made
in Whitehall and, at times, guidance seems to conflict e.g. how does strong local
leadership fit with empowerment and partnership? (Lovell and Rowe, 2002; Rowe,
2003; Broussine and Fox, 2002) As a consequence, the new governance in practice often
takes the form of uncoordinated and unconnected strands at a local level. One part of a
local authority leads on the community strategy, another consults separately on, for
example, education provision, while yet another tries to inform a best value review
with user views.
Second, public agencies often lack an understanding of how and capacity to engage
in dialogue with their own frontline staff, let alone audiences beyond the public sector,
particularly excluded communities but also the voluntary and small business sectors
(Geddes, 2001; Mayo, 1997). Nor is there an understanding that the culture of public
agencies needs to change in order to effectively engage in partnership working
(Broussine and Fox, 2002). For many local authorities, consultation elicits the usual list
of complaints, so what is the point? For others, community forums are dominated by
the “usual suspects” with a particular axe to grind. In this context, it is unsurprising to
find public authorities avoiding and ignoring consultation or, in some cases,
manipulating it (Lovell and Rowe, 2002).
Third, even where there is evidence that public agencies understand the policy,
there is significant reluctance to genuinely engage with it. For many agencies at a local
level, partnerships are not about the sharing of power but are more concerned with the
presentation of change in order to secure additional funding (Rowe and Devanney,
2003). “Shopfront partnerships”, dominated by one of the main public agencies, often
but not always the local authority, present all the trappings of engaging excluded
voices while relinquishing little power. Crucial in maintaining this control is the
Accountable Body, responsible for ensuring the financial probity of partnerships in a
regeneration context. Able to influence and veto spending decisions, the Accountable
Body can strangle initiative with rules while awarding resources to agencies able to
meet their stringent requirements, thus distorting the practice of partnerships.
IJSSP
26,5/6
210
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)
Finally, and perhaps most crucially, even where there is genuine commitment to the
ideas, partnership requires a significant investment of time and energy, often for
relatively meagre returns in terms of financial resources. At the first sign of difficulty,
it is easier to argue for an end to genuine partnership than it is to struggle to make it
work, with all the investment, on the part of all sectors and individuals concerned, that
that entails. Despite its early commitment to broad-based partnerships, the current
government appears to be turning towards a much narrower model in the form of
Urban Regeneration Companies, in part as a reaction to the problems experienced with
New Deal for Communities, amongst other programmes.
In the context of multiple partnerships, operating in the same geographical area,
drawing on the same communities for volunteers, often engaging with similar
“clients” but with different objectives, it should come as no surprise that the
putative benefits of the new forms of governance are often lost in practice. Close
attention has been paid to the minutiae of processes and of power imbalances
between participants in partnerships (e.g. Hastings, 1996; Southern, 2002). However,
it is not the purpose of this paper to further elaborate on the problems posed by
different forms and understandings of partnership. Rather it is to go beyond these
understandings to consider the form that relationships within partnerships take. In
so doing, I intend to begin to explore some of the more psychological dimensions to
failure and indicate the potential of such insights as the basis for intervention in
struggling partnerships.
Narratives of abusive partnerships
The ambiguity, confusion and lack of enthusiasm with which partnerships are
sometimes approached are aggravated by efforts to maintain control of the
arrangements while presenting the impression of genuine partnership working.
Some such efforts are more deliberate than others. However, irrespective of whether
they are deliberate, each has unintended and damaging consequences. The remainder
of this paper will present anonymised narratives, some drawing upon more than one
programme, of efforts to direct, control or contain the work of partnerships. The order
in which they are presented does not reflect any simple scale of seriousness but a
progression from relatively crude and simple efforts to more complex and problematic
relationships. After each, some indicators of problems within a partnership will be
drawn out.
Infantilising partnership
Awarded New Deal for Communities (NDC) funding, the local authority established a
partnership that sought to bring a range of people around the table. However, unwilling or
unable to trust the partnership as an autonomous body, the authority seconded staff to the
new organisation and put in place a tough Accountable Body agreement that ensured all
decisions were thoroughly vetted by the authority. While not intended as a way of fixing
decisions, partners and particularly residents, balked at the unnecessarily heavy-handed
rules and procedures introduced. Decisions to hinder progress on some applications for funds,
many from voluntary and community groups, were contrasted to the successful bids
submitted by public agencies. It appeared to be a deliberate attempt to control the funding
rather than a cautious approach to partnership working. The partnership soon struggled
under the burden of suspicions and hostilities.
Abusive
partnerships
211
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)
The tendency to introduce unnecessarily strict systems and controls, to pack theme
groups with professionals and to undervalue the perspective of residents and other lay
people is, perhaps, the most commonly encountered form of abuse. It often arises from
a genuine concern to support a partnership and to ensure the proper use of funds.
Seconding staff may be intended as a sign of commitment and goodwill. But, to local
people, it can seem overbearing at least and cynical at worst. In one case, upon which
this story is drawn in part, the local authority was appalled and offended by
accusations of overbearing and dominance. Senior councillors pointed to examples of
partnerships struggling without proper systems of appraisal, approval or financial
control as reasons for wishing to ensure that “their” NDC was well run. However, their
approach to the problem has soured relationships within the partnership and, having
been brought to the surface, will take some considerable effort to heal.
In such partnerships, simple indicators of problems include:
.
a preponderance of staff seconded by one public agency;
.
public agencies dominating decision-making in, for example, theme or working
groups; and
.
patterns of spend that indicate a bias towards local public agencies with few
small and/or innovative projects.
Yet, at least one can say that, in such instances, there is no explicit intent to undermine
the practice of partnership. This is in contrast to other forms of abusive partnership.
Shotgun partnership
In order to secure Neighbourhood Renewal Funds (NRF), a community was required to form a
Local Strategic Partnership (LSP). The local authority intervened at an early stage,
interpreting the funding as “theirs”. Senior councillors and officers believed the process of
partnership to be an unnecessarily time-consuming way of allocating resources. Rather than
waste time over a relatively small amount of money, senior officers were invited to identify
priorities for spending to be met from NRF (in their enthusiasm, officers managed to identify
twice the funding available). All available funding was committed for three years. When the
LSP finally met and was tasked to develop a programme within a very short timescale, they
were presented with one already completed. The local authority did not even attempt to
pretend that this was up for discussion. The purpose of the LSP was simply to allow them to
draw down the funding. A subsequent evaluation diplomatically suggested their approach
was unfortunate. Progress on the priorities of the partnership has been hindered by this
opening ploy, one that soured relationships between the major public agencies across the
authority. Indeed, the community representatives now take up an adversarial stance vis-a
`
-vis
the local authority.
Rather than negotiating priorities with partners, establishing baseline information,
setting targets and developing interventions, all of which takes time, there is a
tendency among some in the public sector to simply act. In most authorities, there are
ideas that have been floated before but, for lack of funding, have never been taken
forward. Every new funding stream is another opportunity to try to secure resources,
regardless of the fit with the objectives of the funding stream or with the needs of
intended beneficiaries. For some public agencies, successfully securing funds is an
important indicator of the effectiveness of officers, encouraging a crude
budget-maximising approach (Niskanen, 1971; Dunleavy, 1991). In this case, the
IJSSP
26,5/6
212
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)
selected projects were largely a range of standard responses to crime (CCTV, street
lighting and mobile youth teams) and educational underachievement (family liaison
officers, truancy sweeps and library improvements). Creating trusting relationships
with public, business and voluntary agencies on the LSP after such a cynical
plundering of funds is unimaginably difficult. How does a partnership discuss joint
working and collaboration against this background?
In such partnerships, simple indicators of problems include:
.
a lack of clarity about purpose, roles and responsibilities;
.
opaque decision-making processes;
.
projects that show no signs of innovation or of joint-working and are often the
continuation or extension of existing initiatives;
.
projects with little focus upon areas of deprivation or priority client groups; and
.
highly structured meetings with game-playing and formalised conflict.
While this represents a comparatively crude strategy for securing resources, others
have similar purposes but operate within a more “sophisticated” political climate.
Partnership of convenience
Children’s Fund resources are intended to support innovative projects targeted at children at
risk of, for example, exclusion from school. Funds should be spent by a partnership that
engages and is informed by consultation with parents and children. Awarded a small amount,
one local authority created a partnership structure. Bringing together they major providers,
notably education, social services and health (though with the latter in a very minor role) with
their constituencies of voluntary sector providers allowed funding to be diverted to
supplement existing funding. Each participant gained funding with minimal scrutiny of
project proposals. At the same time, access to resources bought off any possibility of
dissenting voices, particularly among those voluntary sector organisations providing
services to the black and minority ethnic communities.
Drawing upon the darker side of networks, the partnership thus created bound
participants into a complicit relationship. Each benefits without being open to scrutiny
from the others. Externally, it presents all the appearance of a partnership, with
appropriate paperwork detailing discussions and decisions about funding priorities,
conflicts of interest etc.
However, analysis of the way in which funds have been spent in one such
partnership and a comparison of recipients to the membership of the partnership and
the theme/working group members indicates that only two organisations not directly
engaged in the partnership received any funds in the first round of over 20 awards. In
total, 95 per cent of funds were distributed to organisations participating in the
decisions of the partnership. The majority of funds went to the local authority, but key
voluntary and community organisations also received their share. Revealing a degree
of cynical calculation, the proportion of spending on groups that classified themselves
as serving black and minority ethnic communities almost exactly mirrored their
proportion in the population as a whole. And as an indication of the degree to which the
investment represented innovation, brief descriptions of projects included the
following phrases: “the fund will supplement ...”; “fund money will be used to
Abusive
partnerships
213
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)
continue paying ...”; “the project aims to enhance existing ...”; and “allow the centre
to keep running to full capacity ...”.
In such partnerships, simple indicators of problems include:
.
opaque decision-making processes;
.
projects that show no signs of innovation or of joint-working and are often the
continuation or extension of existing initiatives;
.
projects with little focus upon areas of deprivation or priority client groups;
.
theme or working groups dominated by service providers; and
.
a spending profile that mirrors the participants in the partnership.
While, in a local context, this approach might be seen as politically “sophisticated”,
ensuring funds are disbursed to particular groups and interests, it is neither a
partnership nor are its chances of radically altering the experiences and services
available to the intended beneficiaries great. But it stops short of being actively
destructive.
Abusive partnership
One regeneration partnership was formed in the face of opposition from the local authority,
which had wanted other wards to benefit. Residents formed a board, which they dominated.
However, they lacked experience in the basics of establishing an organisation, setting up
systems and overseeing staff. They turned for advice to their Accountable Body, a public
agency that had stepped in, in place of the local authority. The Accountable Body advised on
the appointment of a chief executive without a job description or any clear lines of oversight
from the board. They established project approval and monitoring processes that lacked
clarity or robustness but over which they had complete control. In effect, the organisation
lacked any rules or structures. The Accountable Body and chief executive, between them,
took control of decision-making, the funding and the board. A select group of board members
was embraced by the chief executive and the Accountable Body and given privileged access
to decision making. Other members of the board were excluded from influence. As a
consequence, the two groups of board members effectively formed opposing voting blocks
over the main issues. Meanwhile, the chief executive and the Accountable Body were able to
work deals to spend funds on capital projects and investments with little regard to
cost-effectiveness or conflicts of interest. While board members blamed each other for the
partnership’s lack of impact, the funds were rapidly depleted. Why abusive? Because the
Accountable Body and chief executive quite deliberately manipulated people, their
weaknesses and aspirations, in order to pit them against each other.
Having fallen foul of the local authority, this partnership welcomed the salvation
offered by another public agency. On the surface, a number of local priorities were
being delivered, though the impact was questionable, but others were not. At the same
time, a series of large capital projects, not envisaged in original plans arising from
consultation, emerged. When some residents realised that they had lost control of the
programme, they raised objections and sought to challenge decisions made in ways
they could not penetrate. However, their choice of language and tactics meant that they
were easily dismissed as troublemakers. Arguments about priorities and principles
were countered with accusations about personal conduct. The board slowly slid into
accusations, factions and bitter infighting.
IJSSP
26,5/6
214
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)
In essence, the abusive partnership is similar in appearance to an infantilising one.
However, the actions are much more conscious and deliberate. The Accountable Body
saw the regeneration programme as an opportunity to enter new territory, to fund a
number of ambitious schemes and to increase its local and national profile at the
expense of the local authority. It entailed paying lip service to the idea of engaging
residents while manipulating the way in which they were involved. In such
partnerships, simple indicators of problems include:
.
an overbearing and intrusive role for the Accountable Body;
.
opaque decision-making processes;
.
the Accountable Body dominating decision making in, for example, theme or
working groups;
.
blurred conflicts of interest procedures;
.
lack of reporting to and oversight by the board;
.
lack of engagement with other local public agencies; and
.
bitter and highly personal arguments on the board and between the board and
staff.
These symptoms, and other combinations of them, are to be found in many
partnerships. They indicate imbalances in power within partnerships. Yet they are not
new, nor unique to partnerships, regeneration or, indeed, the public sector. As indicated
earlier, the recent history of regeneration in the UK is scattered with similar concerns
and issues. The Committee of Public Accounts and the Committee on Standards in
Public Life have highlighted similar issues elsewhere in the public sector. In the private
sector, concerns over the lack of accountability of executives to their boards, the
distribution of power within boards and the relationship of boards to shareholders and
wider stakeholders have dominated debates about corporate governance for many
years (Warren, 2000).
However, the issues have been allowed to develop and even been aggravated by the
government’s desire to let local communities take control of neighbourhood renewal.
The issues that arose in a number of the narratives presented here were well known to
the relevant Government Offices whose responsibility it is to oversee and assist
partnerships. Yet they have proven remarkably slow and unwilling to react, in some
cases arguing explicitly that it is for partnerships to develop their own processes and
structures. In other cases, Government Offices have been complicit in the initial
arrangements and, thus, hamstrung when problems arose.
But other public bodies have oversight of neighbourhood renewal. At a local level,
the Audit Commission has limited access, often in its role as auditor of the
organisations performing the Accountable Body role. At a national level, the National
Audit Office has a limited capacity to do more than a financial audit of 39 NDCs, 88
LSPs with NRF, countless action zones and other partnerships across the country. Its
recent value for money study of NDCs could only look at a handful in any great detail
(NAO, 2004). So, even though public auditors now have an explicit responsibility for
scrutinising governance issues and standards of conduct, they are not in a position to
carry it out to any great effect.
At the same time, it is not an easy task to spot a “good” partnership. Most
partnerships will exhibit one or more of the symptoms identified in this paper without
Abusive
partnerships
215
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)
their necessarily being abusive. Yet it would be fair to comment that the absence,
indeed opposite, of the symptoms outlined above would constitute grounds for
confidence in the strength of a partnership. A board and staff team drawing from a
range of backgrounds and experiences; an open and transparent decision-making
structure; clarity of purpose and vision; innovative and cross-cutting projects;
collaborative arrangements with partners; and constructive board discussions would
all indicate a healthy partnership (Rowe and Devanney, 2003).
Reflections
I have argued elsewhere (Rowe and Devanney, 2003) that the failure to recognise
questions of governance is a serious one. The ideas of network forms of management,
upon which the policy of partnership explicitly draws, are most commonly discussed in
the context of self-generated and voluntary groups, within and between organisations,
developed over time. Most commonly to be found within professions, notably amongst
doctors, network members often share common perspectives and backgrounds. In such
contexts, and over time, relationships can be created in which solidarity, altruism,
loyalty, reciprocity and trust are generated (Thompson, 1993). When drawing diverse
participants with different perspectives and knowledge bases together in a relatively
short timescale, partnerships in a neighbourhood renewal context seek to draw on the
positive ideals of networks without understanding the problems that the context
presents. It is not surprising, therefore, that they confront some of the darker sides of
the idea of networks: exclusion; opacity; collusion and corruption.
Yet the forms of abuse described in the partnership arrangements above are not
new. They are precisely those to be found in Urban Development Corporations, in a
variety of other arms length public agencies and in the private sector. The misuse of
power and authority, control of decisions and processes and manipulation of boards
are not new. They take place in a new and particular context but are, fundamentally,
tried and tested techniques. What is perhaps new is the passivity of government (and
other oversight agencies) in the face of evident problems. In a number of the cases,
from which the examples cited above are drawn, substantial evidence has been
available to government, politicians and auditors for some years. Yet in all cases, they
continue, largely unchecked. This is the result, to a large degree, of an unwillingness to
interfere in a “bottom-up” approach to regeneration combined with a lack of capacity in
overseeing bodies to either identify or resolve problems. And it is to the understanding
of the nature of tensions within partnerships that this paper seeks to contribute.
Throughout this piece, I have used the metaphor of partnerships as marriages. This
is not merely to generate witty sub-titles for each of the narratives. Rather, it serves the
purpose of highlighting the importance of relationships in the management of
multi-sector partnerships (Kets de Vries, 1999). Understanding the problems and
tensions that arise in partnerships in terms of relationships does not just better our
understanding of the problems but also suggests ways of resolving them. While the
tendency is for government offices to intervene in problematic partnerships by
imposing rules and codes of conduct to suppress dissent and disagreement,
interventions informed by an understanding of relationships might suggest a very
different approach. In some of the narratives presented in this piece (the infantilising
and shotgun partnerships), the differences in perspective are profound. Resolving the
IJSSP
26,5/6
216
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)
tensions actually requires recognising them openly, allowing conflict to come to the
surface.
Challenging people’s behaviour and attitudes is, however, neither easy nor
something with which oversight bodies readily engage. Yet increasing the capacity of
Government Offices and of auditors to recognise the symptoms of abusive
partnerships and to engage in challenge is a first step towards addressing some of
the problems that have emerged from the new regeneration agenda. Without these
skills, the good side of partnerships will continue, in many if not all cases, to be
overshadowed by the darker side.
References
Broussine, M. and Fox, P. (2002), “Rethinking leadership in local government: the place of
‘feminine’ styles in the modernised council”, Local Government Studies, Vol. 28 No. 4,
pp. 91-106.
Byrne, D. (2001), “Partnership participation power: the meaning of empowerment in
post-industrial society”, in Balloch, S. and Taylor, M. (Eds), Partnership Working: Policy
And Practice, Policy Press, Bristol.
Cabinet Office (1999), Modernising Government, The Stationery Office, London.
Committee of Public Accounts (1994), The Proper Conduct of Public Business, The Stationery
Office, London.
Committee on Standards in Public Life (1996), Second Report: Local Public Spending Bodies, The
Stationery Office, London.
Committee on Standards in Public Life (1997a), Third Report: Standards of Conduct in Local
Government in England, Scotland and Wales, The Stationery Office, London.
Committee on Standards in Public Life (1997b), Fourth Report: Review of Standards of Conduct in
Executive NDPBs, NHS Trusts and Local Public Spending Bodies, The Stationery Office,
London.
Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions (2001), Strong Local Leadership:
Quality Public Services, DTLR, London.
Dunleavy, P. (1991), Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London.
Geddes, M. (2001), “The United Kingdom: a stake in the market?”, in Geddes, M. and Benington, J.
(Eds), Local Partnerships and Social Exclusion in the European Union: New Forms of Local
Social Governance?, Routledge, London.
Hastings, A. (1996), “Unravelling the process of ‘partnership’ in urban regeneration policy”,
Urban Studies, Vol. 33 No. 2, pp. 253-68.
Jones, P. (2003), “Regeneration’s poisoned chalice: is there an impasse in (community),
participation-based policy?”, Urban Studies, Vol. 40 No. 3, pp. 581-601.
Kets de Vries, M. (1999), “What’s playing in the organizational theater? Collusive relationships in
management”, Human Relations, Vol. 52 No. 6, pp. 745-73.
Lister, R. (2002), “A politics of recognition and respect: involving people with experience of
poverty in decision making that affects their lives”, Social Policy and Society, Vol. 1 No. 1,
pp. 37-46.
Lovell, A. and Rowe, M. (2002), “The missing Cs: connecting and contextualising best value”,
paper presented at the European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management
Conference, Dublin, September.
Abusive
partnerships
217
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)
Lowndes, V. and Sullivan, H. (2004), “Like a horse and carriage or a fish on a bicycle: how well do
local partnerships and public participation go together?”, Local Government Studies,
Vol. 30 No. 1, pp. 51-73.
Mayo, M. and Taylor, M. (2001), “Partnerships and power in community regeneration”, in
Balloch, S. and Taylor, M. (Eds), Partnership Working: Policy and Practice, Policy Press,
Bristol.
Mayo, M. (1997), “Partnerships for regeneration and community development: some
opportunities, challenges and constraints”, Critical Social Policy, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 3-26.
National Audit Office (1997), Wind up of Leeds and Bristol Urban Development Corporations,
The Stationery Office, London.
National Audit Office (2002), The Operation and Wind up of Teesside Development Corporation,
The Stationery Office, London.
National Audit Office (2004), English Regions: An Early Progress Report on the New Deal for
Communities Programme, The Stationery Office, London.
Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (2003), New Deal for Communities: The National Evaluation
2002/2003, NRU Research Report No. 7, Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, London.
Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (2004), Transformation and Sustainability. Future Support,
Management and Monitoring of the New Deal For Communities Programme,
Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, London.
Niskanen, W. (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Aldine, Chicago, IL.
Powell, M., Exworthy, M. and Berney, L. (2001), “Playing the game of partnership”, in Sykes, R.,
Bochel, C. and Ellison, N. (Eds), Social Policy Review 13: Developments and Debates,
2000-2001, Policy Press, Bristol.
Rhodes, J., Tyler, P. and Brennan, A. (2003), “New developments in area-based initiatives in
England: the experience of the single regeneration budget”, Urban Studies, Vol. 40 No. 8,
pp. 1399-426.
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997), Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and
Accountability, Open University Press, Buckingham.
Roberts, P. (1999), “The evolution, definition and purpose of urban regeneration”, in Roberts, P.
and Sykes, H. (Eds), Urban Regeneration: a Handbook, Sage, London.
Rowe, M. and Devanney, C. (2003), “Partnership and the governance of regeneration”, Critical
Social Policy, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 375-97.
Rowe, M. and Taylor, M. (2005), “Community-led regeneration: learning loops or reinvented
wheels?”, in Balloch, S. and Taylor, D. (Eds), Politics of Evaluation: Participation and Policy
Implementation, Policy Press, Bristol.
Rowe, M. (2003), “Partnerships, participation and leadership: reconciling the irreconcilable?”,
paper presented at the Leadership, Voice and Accountability Conference, Bristol,
September.
6, P. (1997), Holistic Government, Demos, London.
Social Exclusion Unit (1998), Bringing Britain Together: A National Strategy for Neighbourhood
Renewal, The Stationery Office, London.
Southern, R. (2002), “Understanding multi-sectoral regeneration partnerships as a form of local
governance”, Local Government Studies, Vol. 28 No. 2, pp. 16-32.
Taylor, M. (2000), “Communities in the lead: power, organisational capacity and social capital”,
Urban Studies, Vol. 37 Nos 5-6, pp. 1019-35.
IJSSP
26,5/6
218
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)
Taylor, M. (2001), “Partnership: insiders and outsiders”, in Harris, M. and Rochester, C. (Eds),
Voluntary Organisations and Social Policy in Britain: Perspectives on Change and Choice,
Palgrave, Basingstoke.
Taylor, M. (2003), “Neighbourhood governance: Holy Grail or poisoned chalice?”, Local Economy,
Vol. 18 No. 3, pp. 190-5.
Thompson, G. (1993), “Network coordination”, in Maidment, R. and Thompson, G. (Eds),
Managing the United Kingdom, Sage, London.
Warren, R. (2000), Corporate Governance and Accountability, Liverpool Academic Press,
Liverpool.
Watson, T. (2000), “Ethnographic fiction science: making sense of managerial work and
organizational research processes with Caroline and Terry”, Organization , Vol. 7 No. 3,
pp. 489-510.
About the author
Mike Rowe is a Lecturer in Public Management at the University of Liverpool Management
School, University of Liverpool, UK. He can be contacted at: Michael.Rowe @liverpool.ac.uk
Abusive
partnerships
219
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: reprints@emeraldinsight.com
Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)
This article has been cited by:
1. Ruth Rogers. 2015. Taking Responsibility for the Provision of Financial, Housing, and Emotional Support
for Young People Leaving Care. Australian Social Work 68, 99-114. [CrossRef]
2. Iain Lindsey. 2014. Prospects for Local Collaboration into an Uncertain Future: Learning from Practice
within Labour's Partnership Paradigm. Local Government Studies 40, 312-330. [CrossRef]
3. Gunjan Saxena. 2014. Cross-Sector Regeneration Partnership Strategies and Tourism. Tourism Planning
& Development 11, 86-105. [CrossRef]
4. Ali Unlu, Jonathan Matusitz, Gerald-Mark Breen, Lawrence Martin. 2012. The Impact of 9/11 on
Information Policy in the United States: A Current Perspective on Homeland Security and Emergency
Management. Journal of Applied Security Research 7:3, 320-340. [CrossRef]
5. Rod Dacombe. 2011. Who leads?. International Journal of Leadership in Public Services 7:3, 218-228.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
6. Chris Mackintosh. 2011. An analysis of County Sports Partnerships in England: the fragility, challenges
and complexity of partnership working in sports development. International Journal of Sport Policy and
Politics 3:1, 45-64. [CrossRef]
7. Dave Adamson. 2010. Community empowerment. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy
30:3/4, 114-126. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
8. John Diamond, Joyce Liddle, Paul O'Hare. 2010. Capacity building for community‐led regeneration.
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 30:1/2, 32-47. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
9. Mark Baker, Stephen Hincks. 2009. Infrastructure delivery and spatial planning: <i>The case of English
Local Development Frameworks</i>. Town Planning Review 80:2, 173-199. [CrossRef]
10. Jon Coaffee, Nicola Headlam. 2008. Pragmatic localism uncovered: The search for locally contingent
solutions to national reform agendas. Geoforum 39:4, 1585-1599. [CrossRef]
Downloaded by SELCUK UNIVERSITY At 11:19 23 January 2015 (PT)